Crowded waters: naval competition in the Asia–Pacific

Overview: This report analyses the regional trend of key nations investing in more capable naval and air platforms. In Northeast Asia, countries include China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In Southeast Asia, the paper looks at Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. This analysis is used to determine potential implications for Australia’s strategic position in the region and for the ADF. Australia’s future force structure decisions have to account in particular for a changing military balance in Southeast Asia

Country Report: Taiwan; Deterring, Denying, and Defending

Understanding Taiwan's ability to defend itself against mainland China is becoming increasingly significant as the likelihood of a cross-straits conflict rises. Taipei is unlikely to unify with China on Beijing's terms, and Beijing is unlikely to relinquish its claim that Taiwan falls under its domestic jurisdiction. Even a confrontation over Taiwan that falls short of war will have regional and global ramifications

Power and International relations: Essays in Honour of Coral Bell

Coral Mary Bell AO, who died in 2012, was one of the world’s foremost academic experts on international relations, crisis management and alliance diplomacy. This collection of essays by more than a dozen of her friends and colleagues is intended to honour her life and examine her ideas and, through them, her legacy

Beyond the Arms Race: Explaining the Modernization of Naval and Associated Air Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific (2001-2016)

This thesis addresses the question of whether it is possible to construct a generic explanation for the current modernization of many armed forces in the Asia-Pacific, specifically in the naval domain. It argues that the concept of “arms race or arms racing,” although widely employed and the subject of a voluminous literature, is in fact a rather weak analytical device for explaining these armament dynamics. Consequently, the thesis sets out to explain the factors driving the modernization of naval and associated air capabilities in key Asia-Pacific countries between 2001 and 2016. The primary motivations behind these armament dynamics ranged from a fear of US withdrawal from the region, the rise of China, enhancing self-defense requirements, and maritime territorial disputes. Due to the assumption that these armament dynamics are competitive it has become tempting for scholars and the media to label such strategic behavior of the use of force as an “arms race,” broadly understood as a progressive and competitive increase in armaments by two or more states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual fears. The analysis of the case studies demonstrates that “arms race” theories are of limited utility as they strip states of any purposeful involvement in the armament process. The dissertation argues that a new set of propositions to understand interactive armament dynamics is needed. Responding and interacting to one or more opponents’ armaments implies that decision-makers have deemed an armaments policy necessary to secure state survival in response to a perceived threat. As states are reacting to their broader strategic environment rather than a single adversary, interactive arming must involve two or more actors, and both qualitative and quantitative changes must be present. Interactive arming dynamics also exhibits highly competitive security behavior that does not directly involve the armed forces. This can take the form of enhanced strategic partnerships, intelligence-sharing, and defense technology transfers. This is often a response to a perceived asymmetry in a relationship, in which a country acknowledges that its armed forces will never be equal to a potential opponent’s

Burying the hatchet? : the sources and limits of Japan-South Korea security cooperation

This article critically evaluates the basis, aspirations, and prospects for bilateral security cooperation between Japan and South Korea. The assumption that common enemies, friends, and interests should have given rise to solid and steadily improving relations between Tokyo and Seoul has been far from realized. Rather, the Japan-ROK relationship continues to be marked by highly volatile behavior - ranging from intense friction to reluctant cooperation - which not only offers a vexing puzzle to the Realist school of international relations but also to the Constructivist one. This article argues that despite the perceived improvement in relations, Japan-South Korea security cooperation is situational and limited; recent developments do not imply a fundamental realignment of the two powers towards one another.18 page(s

Avoiding Nuclear War in the Taiwan Strait

China’s improving nuclear arsenal, the United States’ deteriorating “strategic ambiguity” policy, and Taiwan’s increasing identification as independent polity raises the prospect of conflict over Taiwan. But the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits would happen only under extreme circumstances. This paper argues Beijing is increasing its use of gray-zone tactics with conventional and non-military means below the level of nuclear provocation to tip the cross-straits military balance in its favor. This report first examines China’s aim to achieve unification with Taiwan via its use of threat and use of force in both the nuclear and conventional domains through a close examination of the three historical cross-strait crises. Second, it outlines the geostrategic and geopolitical rationale for continued American support for Taiwan in an era of United States-China competition. Lastly, it explores the role of Taiwan’s consolidating democracy and how Taipei responds to Beijing’s coercion. The report concludes with consideration of how the Taiwan Straits case may affect the possibility of nuclear weapons use in Northeast Asia, including in Japan and on the Korean peninsula

The Defining divide : cross-strait relations and the US, Taiwan, China strategic dynamic

The recent improvements in cross-strait relations under the Ma administration have been interpreted as heralding a deeper rapprochement between Taiwan and China. Economic and political cross-strait initiatives have proliferated, while social linkages are re-emerging. Yet fundamental barriers remain that may lead to heightened future tensions. Taiwanese and Chinese citizens hold to increasingly distinct cultural and political identities. Strategically, support for the status quo is weakening between Washington, Taipei and Beijing, as the latter begins to threaten the regional primacy of the former.11 page(s

Country Report: Taiwan : Deterring, Denying, Defending

This report assesses trends in Taiwan’s defense policy and force posture. The Republic of China’s (ROC, Taiwan) armed forces’ primary aim is to deter the People’s Republic of China (PRC, China) from military aggression against Taiwan’s main island and offshore islands. In the event of such a contingency, the ROC armed forces aim to deny the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) the ability to establish mainland China’s rule over Taipei. But Beijing is ratcheting up military pressure on Taiwan to coerce it to accept “peaceful reunification” on Chinese terms. This includes record-setting air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in October 2021 and the regular holding of military drills and amphibious landings on small islands near Taiwan. As well, in response to the 2022 visit of the US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, China held its largest live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait with the firing of ballistic missiles and the deployment of warships and fighter jets. The exercises simulated a blockade of Taiwan and infringed on Taiwan’s territorial waters. Such scenarios have demonstrated the vulnerabilities in Taiwan’s defense, including a haphazard force structure, lack of readiness, and dependence on US military and diplomatic support. The United States has recently stated that it would prevent changes to the cross-strait status quo by bolstering Taiwan’s defense against China. As a result, America’s Indo-Pacific allies and partners are considering how to contribute to Taiwan’s defense and deterrence against China. Also, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded Taiwan and other countries in the Indo-Pacific that the possibility of war in the Taiwan Strait is very real. The willingness with which Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and Singapore responded to the Biden administration’s call to sanction Russia and provide assistance to Ukraine suggests that the Indo-Pacific would be looking to Europe for similar support should China provoke conflict. Today, neither Europe nor the Indo-Pacific can continue to hold the notion that “far-away” conflicts will not have political, economic, or strategic repercussions on their own neighborhood. This report begins by tracing Taiwan’s evolution to a de facto sovereign nation with a unique geopolitical and geostrategic status. It then looks at the country’s military capabilities and modernization plans and examines whether Taipei can meet its objectives to deter and deny China from using force to impose sovereign control over Taiwan. Taiwan is investing in missile defense and asymmetric weapons to signal to China that it would incur high costs if it decided to invade. Should such an invasion occur, Taiwan’s armed forces must meet certain requirements to defend its littoral coast and offshore islands. For China to invade Taiwan, PLA forces would have to dominate the air and sea approaches to Taiwan, land amphibious forces, and deliver sufficient manpower, weapons, logistics, and supplies to achieve control over Taiwan. Such an effort would also mean occupying Taiwan’s offshore islands which could otherwise be used to cut off the PLA from resupply and support from the mainland. Due to their geostrategic position, the islands also serve as an early warning system for Taiwan, the United States, and its allies. As part of its deterrence effort, Taipei is also attempting to diversify its security partnerships, to increase its standing in the international system, and to raise awareness of the repercussions if China invaded Taiwan. As Taiwan remains reliant on the United States for arms and informal security guarantees under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the 1982 Six Assurances, it is focusing on enhancing its partnerships with the United States’ allies in the region. Primarily, these are Japan and Australia, who have a shared interest in countering China in the East and South China Sea. Taipei may also look to European defense manufacturing nations such as France and Germany to obtain technological and military know-how for its indigenous defense industry. This report continues with an analysis of the regional and international implications of a possible loss of Taiwan’s independence. The United States and its allies have already begun to adjust doctrine and force posture. Regional stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific are also discussing what they can learn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to strategically support Taiwan in the event of a conflict with China. This has heated up the debate within Taiwan – as well as between Taipei and Washington – of how ROC armed forces can succeed in defending Taiwan, deterring China from a unilateral attack, and denying China control over Taiwan and its offshore islands. Moreover, bolstering Taiwan’s defense in the short to medium term would make a lasting contribution to deterring China from aggression and adventurism. Therefore, this report concludes with a set of policy recommendations to hold substantive ex - changes between Taiwan, Europe, and the IndoPacific. The recommendations are based on the assumption that war over Taiwan is not a certainty. Key recommendations include establishing an official dialogue between Taiwanese and Europe - an lawmakers to exchange knowledge on countering foreign interference and disinformation. NATO and Taiwan should set up a working group to raise awareness of the implications to both the IndoPacific and Europe of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This could include a wargame about the consequences of a Taiwan Strait conflict on Russia’s calculations in Europe and NATO deployments. Lastly, it would be useful for Taiwan, other Indo-Pacific nations, and European countries to share insights on improving societal resilience and civil defense capabilities. Such joint efforts would signal to China the willingness to punish actions that change the cross-straits status quo. This could contribute to deterring China from conducting a unilateral attack on Taiwan and its territories and might decrease the likelihood of conflict.DGAP Country Report From the Project "Risk Reduction and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region"</p